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COMMENTARIES
HYBRIDIZING CITIZENSHIP
Kathryn Abrams *
I. INTRODUCTION
In Voting with Dollars,1 Ackerman and Ayres propose a system
of campaign finance that they candidly describe as "hybrid."2 It is
hybrid in the sense that it combines two strategies for addressing
the ills of current campaign funding. It addresses the corrupting
influence of private contributions by requiring that they be made
through a "secret donation booth," a blind trust that prevents
candidates from knowing the identities of their supporters. In
addition, it addresses the disproportionate weight of such contri-
butions by introducing a novel system of public finance: the gov-
ernment provides each registered voter with fifty "Patriot" dol-
lars, which can be pledged to the candidate(s) of the voter's
choice.4 But, more importantly, the proposed system is a hybrid of
the conceptual models on which it draws. In some respects the
system "mimics ... core attributes of the franchise."5 It offers
equality and non-transferability, which in the case of private do-
* Herma Hill Kay Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, Berke-
ley School of Law (Boalt Hall); Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. B.A., 1980, Harvard
University; J.D., 1984, Yale Law School. Many thanks to Angela Harris for helpful conver-
sations on the subject of this Comment, to Dan Farber for thoughtful comments on an ear-
lier draft, and to Ginny Irving and Guy-Uriel Charles for wonderful, resourceful guidance
on some aspects of the research.
1. BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW PARADIGM FOR
CAMPAIGN FINANCE (2002).
2. Id. at 25.
3. Id. at 6.
4. Id. at 12-18.
5. Id. at9.
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nations is supplemented with anonymity.6 Yet the system also
enlists the individualistic energies of the market. Each voter
spends her Patriot dollars in the way that she sees fit, exercising
a "citizen sovereignty" that draws consciously on the dynamics of
consumer sovereignty.7
In this Comment, I consider the implications of this hybridity
by focusing on the Patriot dollar feature. This feature is crucial to
the operation of the paradigm, not simply because this public
funding has the potential to outweigh private spending and to
compensate for the deficits created by the anonymity of the dona-
tion booth. It is also valued by the authors as a means of re-
energizing participatory democracy and rendering the individual
voter, quite literally, more invested in the stakes of electoral con-
tests.' I will argue, however, that the hybrid character of this sys-
tem works more neatly in theory than it is likely to work in prac-
tice. Individual voters may have difficulty conceiving this new
role, and they may respond to it in ways that conflict starkly with
the authors' purposes. The role may be more readily understood
by the intermediaries who, as Ackerman and Ayres acknowledge,
will hasten to reap the benefits of this new source of support.9
But, far from facilitating the emergence of a new paradigm, their
interventions are at least as likely to import into the electoral
system the worst of current campaign practices and the worst of
current consumer culture. In Part II, I examine the authors' de-
scription of and aspirations for the Patriot system. In Part III, I
consider the ways in which the Patriot feature may be understood
by voters. In Part IV, I consider the ways that this feature may be
conceptualized and implemented by intermediaries such as patri-
otic political action committees ("PACs") and candidates' cam-
paign committees. In conclusion, I suggest that a plan that is
elaborately designed to prevent circumvention may require more
work in elaborating and fostering among participants the af-
firmative understandings on which it is intended to be based.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 12-18.
8. Id. at 15.
9. See id. at 174-75.
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II. PATRIOT FUNDING: THE FRANCHISE AND THE MARKET
In describing their new paradigm, Ackerman and Ayres alter-
nately emphasize its comparability to the franchise and under-
score its resonances with the market. They unveil the new system
through its juxtaposition to an "old paradigm," consisting of
spending limits, public subsidy, and full information about the
identity of private donors."° Citing this paradigm as the very
model of economic regulation, they note: "We reject a paradigm
drawn from the regulation of widgets and build on a more democ-
ratic tradition centered on the franchise."" The authors then
stress the equality-based origins of the Patriot feature and the
vote;'2 they derive the anonymous donation booth from the time-
honored practice of the secret ballot. 3 Patriot dollars are con-
ferred upon registered voters, and, like the vote, they are non-
delegable, non-transferable, and disappear if they remain un-
used. 4
Yet intertwined with this analogy to the franchise is a second
claim that appears as a subtext of the more explicitly democratic
arguments. According to this analysis, Patriot does indeed bear
the markings of an intervention in the market, but it is not one
that regulates production-rather, it is one that facilitates con-
sumption. Patriot is, after all, a system of spending that permits
citizens to use their money to express their preferences, mainly
through routine transactions at the ATM.'" In a paradoxical pro-
gression, the authors both enlist the energies of consumer sover-
eignty and seek to transcend its individualistic, privatizing dy-
namic." A concluding passage frames Ackerman and Ayres's
embrace of the consumer dynamic most clearly:
Not that we are opposed to free markets. To the contrary, we have
used marketlike reasoning in the service of democratic ideals. Our
whole idea is to carve out a vibrant sphere of politics by creating new
forms of marketlike choice-forms that purify the practice of private
giving while rejuvenating the reality of citizen control. We are, in
10. See id. at 4, 59.
11. Id. at4.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 6.
14. Id. at 12-18.
15. Id. at 69.
16. See id. at 160-61.
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short, responding to the current wave of market triumphalism with
an exercise in intellectual jujitsu: We are calling on our fellow
Americans to rejuvenate their citizenship with the very same con-
sumerist paraphernalia-credit cards and ATMs-that seem to
threaten it most.
Some may find our embrace of these consumerist images dis-
heartening, but Americans will never be persuaded to don tunics and
return to some (idealized) version of the Athenian agora. The chal-
lenge is to enable twenty-first century people to build new forms of
citizenship out of the ordinary materials of modern life-and from
this perspective, there is no better place to look than the neighbor-
hood ATM.
17
Yet Ackerman and Ayres also make clear that their pragmatic
accommodation of the consumer culture does not exclude the pos-
sibility of transformation. They aim not simply to enlist the dy-
namics of consumer sovereignty but to improve upon them; ex-
penditure is, in this sense, the vehicle through which a longer-
term public engagement and political enlivenment will occur. 8
When Americans encounter a barrage of political advertisements on
television today, they think of themselves as passive consumers-
just as they do when viewing advertisements commending fancy cars
or prescription medicines. But political advertising in the patriotic
world will carry a different social meaning. Turning on the TV will
become an occasion for citizens to reflect on their own communicative
choices-should I send my Patriot dollars to insurgent X or political
party Y? In turn, these questions will prompt millions of informal
conversations as countless face-to-face groups consider their options
together.
Nowadays, electioneering prompts affirmative activity from most
citizens only on election day, when they spend the half-hour or so go-
ing to the polls. But the democratization of campaign finance will in-
vite millions to take a small but active role throughout the election
campaign. By casting their patriotic dollars, Americans will be giving
renewed social meaning to their self-understanding as free and equal
citizens, engaging in democratic deliberation.
1 9
In theory, the proposal effects a neat synthesis-the sober
equal opportunity of the franchise, invigorated by energies of con-
sumer sovereignty, and cleansed of its individuality and isolation
by a reconnection to public purpose. But how this synthesis is
17. Id. (citation omitted).
18. See id. at 15.
19. Id.
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likely to proceed in practice" is a more complicated question, to
which I now turn.
III. CITIZEN SOVEREIGNTY IN THE MIND OF THE VOTER
Imagine that you are a voter, under the recently-enacted Vot-
ing with Dollars regime. You take a stroll to your ATM and dis-
cover that, overnight, the government has deposited fifty dollars
in a special account to be used on the campaign(s) of your choice.
Like large numbers of your fellow citizens, you vote with at least
some regularity, but are not a frequent contributor to political
campaigns. How will you understand the transaction in which
you have been invited to take part? To what other activities, in
which you or your fellow citizens regularly engage, will you
analogize it?
In their cheerful appropriation of the dynamics of consumer
sovereignty, Ackerman and Ayres suggest that you will feel as if
you had been invited to make a market choice-as if, for example,
your mother had sent you a check or a gift certificate to Ama-
zon.com.21 They are undoubtedly correct in observing some simi-
20. One could assess the prospects for implementing Ackerman and Ayres's model in
more than one way. Some scholarship in public choice literature, for example, has at-
tempted to determine theoretically and empirically whether the animating principles as-
sumed to be characteristic of market transactions are distinct from or confluent with those
that animate political action, on the part of either voters or representatives. Compare
James M. Buchanan, Politics without Romance: A Sketch of Positive Public Choice Theory
and Its Normative Implications, in THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE-II, 11, 11-21 (James
M. Buchanan & Robert D. Tollison eds., 1984) (arguing that similar models of behavior
apply in political and economic realms), with GEOFFREY BRENNAN & LOREN LOMAsKY,
DEMOCRACY AND DECISION: THE PURE THEORY OF ELECTORAL PREFERENCE 10-16 (1993)
(contesting the application of the assumptions of homo economicus to the political sphere).
My approach in this Comment will be more phenomenological; it will focus on subjective
experience as it bears on understanding and motivation. It will ask, for example, what we
know about the subjective experience of consumption in the market and consider whether
the external features related to that experience (i.e., the enlistment of bank accounts,
ATM cards, and citizen choice), which have been incorporated in the Patriot proposal, will
be sufficient to encourage voters to assimilate their understanding and practice of cam-
paign contribution to that experience.
21. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 14-15. As I note above, Ackerman and
Ayres hope to modify or enrich this consumerist impulse in the realm of campaign contri-
bution, by encouraging voters to make better-informed and more public-spirited decisions
on spending their Patriot dollars than they do in spending their "green" money. See id. at
16-17. But at the outset they seek to draw on its familiar, compulsive energies in order to
draw voters into the practice of spending their Patriot dollars on electoral candidates. See
id. at 4-5.
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larities; you make your transaction at a screen, you expend some
form of financial asset, and you are free to choose as you will
among a range of possibilities contending for your dollar.22 But
market participants are not activated to the role of consumer
choice by the simple weight of a credit card in their pocket. There
is a set of understandings and expectations that underlie the
practices of contemporary market consumption. These under-
standings are distinct from those likely to accompany a Patriot
contribution; so distinct, in fact, that it is unlikely that voters will
see consumerism as the trope through which to construe the gov-
ernment's invitation.
A. The Dubious Analogy to Consumption
To begin with, consumer decisionmaking is based on the notion
of a quid pro quo; in the classical formulation, the consumer's
money is exchanged for some desired commodity. Such a quid pro
quo is not easy to identify within the Patriot scheme. There is not,
in any obvious sense, a tangible product for the citizen to con-
sume. Moreover, a central goal of the new paradigm is to remove
from the process of campaign finance the most conspicuous quid
pro quo of the present system-the exchange of financial support
for political influence over one's preferred candidate.23 Of course,
consumption in late capitalist societies has become both more
complex and less concrete than the quid pro quo idea might sug-
gest. Some theorists have suggested that consumption in our cul-
ture is not entirely-perhaps not even primarily-about the "use
value" of particular commodities.24 Consumers also derive satis-
faction from "anticipation of use value" 25-a feature perpetuated
by increasingly elaborate practices of packaging. More centrally,
the consumer may derive utility from the appearance of use
value, an attribute seized upon in advertising.2" Since the mid-
22. See id. at 67-70.
23. See id. at 6. In addition, the level of public funding that any individual can provide
under the Patriot scheme-twenty-five dollars for a presidential candidate, fifteen dollars
for a senatorial candidate, ten dollars for an aspirant to the House-would not be enough
to secure influence, even in the absence of the secret donation booth. See id. at 182.
24. See SUSAN WILLIS, A PRIMER FOR DAILY LIFE 1-7 (1991).
25. Id. at 6.
26. See id. at 1-7.
27. See id. at 6-8 (emphasis added) (discussing the forms of value in consumer com-
modities).
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twentieth century, when producers recognized that an ever bur-
geoning supply of goods was, in effect, chasing a finite supply of
dollars, a stream of increasingly sophisticated advertising has
helped consumers not only to differentiate among products, but to
understand those products as addressing a range of non-material
consumer needs.2' The purchase of a particular good may contrib-
ute to the image that the consumer has of himself, or to an image
he would like to foster in the minds of others. It may help to me-
diate relations with particular social groups, including class or
status-based groups, racial or ethnic groups, or family of origin.29
Advertising has made a contemporary art form of cultivating
these ascriptive meanings and the desires with which they are
associated, to the point where a young man deliberating about
the purchase of a car may be thinking as much about independ-
ence or masculinity ° as about a means of transportation.
Yet, even when understood in these more encompassing terms,
the payoff for the citizen who expends her Patriot dollars seems
unclear. There are possible, albeit attenuated, analogies to the
anticipation of use value. If Brennan and Buchanan are correct in
their hypothesis that some voters regard an electoral contest as
an engaging competitive ritual-which one approaches with the
enthusiasm of a spectator at a sports telecast-then contributing
to a campaign might be a way of sharing in the preseason or pre-
game excitement, like purchasing a t-shirt or a pennant for one's
favorite team.31 Yet whether participating in such festivities
28. Many cultural theorists would argue that these are needs that the consumer did
not even know he had, prior to his exposure to the advertising. In this sense, they argue
that a pervasive flood of advertising is responsible for engendering those needs that it
then attempts to fill. For examples of this kind of analysis, see Ronald K.L. Collins &
David M. Skover, Commerce & Communication, 71 TEX. L. REV. 697, 699 (1993); Sut
Jhally, Commercial Culture, Collective Values and the Future, 71 TEX. L. REV. 805, 805
(1993) [hereinafter Jhally I]; Sut Jhally, Advertising at the Edge of the Apocalypse [herein-
after Jhally II], at http://www.sutjhally.com/onlinepubs/apocalypse.html. I return to this
analysis of advertising, in Part IV, infra.
29. The purchase of a diet cola or fast food, for a teenager with immigrant parents,
may satisfy hunger or thirst; but it may also signal assimilation into an undifferentiated
category of active, spontaneous American youth, or establish needed distance from her
family of origin. Historian Gary Cross argues that consumerism won the struggle for the
hearts and minds of twentieth-century Americans, specifically because it performed these
functions of social mediation more flexibly and with less conflict than more substantive or
ideological forms of social solidarity. See GARY CROSS, AN ALL-CONSUMING CENTURY: WHY
COMMERCIALISM WON IN MODERN AMERICA 2 (2000).
30. For a discussion of the role of commodity capitalism, with an emphasis on sexual-
ity regarding the gendering of men and women, see WILLIS, supra note 24, at 23-40.
31. See Geoffrey Brennan & James Buchanan, Voter Choice: Evaluating Political Al-
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would have much allure, particularly for those who are not habit-
ual enthusiasts of this particular sport, remains to be seen.
The appearance of use value raises more complicated ques-
tions.32 Contributors might draw some identitarian value from
the contribution, if it led them to regard themselves as part of a
particular group, political movement, or candidate-related insur-
gency. Ackerman and Ayres allude to the possibility of this kind
of transformation-in the contributor's self-conception and in her
understanding of her relation to politics-in the final chapter,
when they discuss the momentary soaring of the campaign (and
the campaign chest) of Senator John McCain.33 However, this
sense of identity might be undercut by the small size of the con-
tribution- ten or fifteen dollars seems too modest an amount to
foster a strong sense of identity or membership,34 particularly if
citizens have not been socialized to believe that any contribution
is sufficient to ground a sense of affiliation. 5 More importantly,
this potential for the development of politically-grounded identity
would be undercut by the slim chance of the materialization of a
political movement. True, the transformation of campaign finance
might make such insurgencies more likely. But citizens still con-
front a system fraught with devices such as geographic districting
and winner-take-all elections, which tax insurgencies and slow
departures from a centrist, two-party status quo. Furthermore,
citizens will be encouraged to contribute early in the campaign,
when it is hard to tell whether a promising candidacy will gather
steam. To citizens in this position, a Patriot contribution may ap-
pear more analogous to the purchase of a lottery ticket, which of-
fers the chance of an identitarian, rather than a financial, payoff.
ternatives, 28 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 185, 186-87 (1984).
32. See WILLIS, supra note 24, at 7.
33. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 168.
34. Ackerman and Ayres note that following McCain's victory in the New Hampshire
primary, he received one million dollars worth of "small" contributions over the Internet.
See id. They do not, however, explain whether these contributions were as small as ten or
fifteen dollars.
35. Here, campaigns under the Voting with Dollars paradigm might have something
to learn from public radio membership drives, which work vigorously to make clear that a
listener can become a full-fledged member and valuable supporter through any level of
contribution. Such socialization seems inconsistent with the present campaign finance re-
gime, which promises proximity to the formation of public policy in direct relation to the
magnitude of one's contribution. It is not inconsistent with Ackerman and Ayres's scheme,
but it is one among several forms of normative elaboration or reinforcement that they do
not provide in the statement of their paradigm.
[Vol. 37:935
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Perhaps more to the point, the sense of identity that is derived
from consumption often comes from its capacity to mark a con-
sumer in the eyes of others. Consumers, as historian Gary Cross
argues, acquire the habit of "reading" each other through the pub-
lic consumption of commodities. 6 There is little opportunity for
such reading, however, in the context of political contribution.
Citizens render their support privately (and in most cases
anonymously) and the Patriot scheme provides no concrete indi-
cia of contribution that can be publicly consumed.37 Without
changes in the elements of the scheme, it seems unlikely that
group membership or any other characteristic will be ascribed to
a citizen as the result of her having contributed Patriot dollars to
a political campaign.
Finally, the lack of transferability or fungibility of Patriot dol-
lars may disturb the analogy to consumer activity. A dollar not
spent on shoes can be spent on a DVD, or it can be saved or in-
vested. Even a gift certificate to Amazon.com can be spent on
books, music, or kitchen supplies. But Patriot dollars cannot be
traded for conventional currency or spent outside of electoral
campaigns.3" This feature distinguishes it from activity in the
market and underscores its analogy to the vote. It may even be a
source of disaffection to the poorest citizen-consumers, who may
feel that the fifty dollars in the Patriot account might be better
expended on a basic need, such as food or rent.
36. See CROSS, supra note 29, at 3-5.
37. There are a variety of non-profit organizations that have pioneered the use of
"thank you gifts" for membership contributions, or low-cost consumer items whose pur-
chase price and logo offer forms of support to the organization. These gifts and commodi-
ties obviously serve as forms of advertising; however, they also serve other purposes in a
society geared to visible and legible consumption. They permit supporters to enjoy an ex-
perience of consumption connected with their expenditure (i.e., some people actually enjoy
using the tote bags or coffee cups that come with contributions to National Public Radio).
They also permit contributors to identify themselves, and each other, as like-minded sup-
porters of particular public-spirited enterprises. This serves an identitarian function, and
also permits consumers to take part in the habitual satisfactions of reading each other
through visibly-consumed commodities. There may well be a role for such gifts under the
Voting with Dollars paradigm: they might well help citizens to analogize contributions
both to activities of mainstream market consumption and to (generally low-level) support
of services such as public radio. However, such a role is not elaborated in Ackerman and
Ayres's articulation of the Patriot dollars scheme.
38. See ACKERAiN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 182.
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B. The Uncertain Effects of Uncertain Analogies
If citizens do not perceive Patriot contribution as analogous to
market consumption, to what other activities might they draw a
parallel? Some might view it as philanthropy, although the small
and well-heeled group for which the category would have salient
meaning would be more likely to apply it to major contribution
through the donation booth than to the comparative pittance
available through the Patriot scheme. Here, too, the absence of
direction or control over the expenditure of one's funds might dis-
turb the analogy.39 Those drawn to a philanthropic analogy might
find Patriot contributions more comparable to the garden-variety
charitable donations made by individuals across the socioeco-
nomic range. But in this case as well, conspicuous disanalogies
might disrupt the perceived parallel. Some of the most salient
motivations behind charitable donation are not present in the Pa-
triot setting.4 ° It is not clear that citizens would experience the
satisfactions of self-sacrifice that help fuel charitable donations
when they are contributing funds that they received as an alloca-
tion from the government.41 Moreover, the emotions of empathic
arousal for the acutely distressed, or concern for those who lack
what the giver may himself possess-that motivate many kinds of
charitable giving-may not be present in the case of campaign
contribution.4 2 An underfinanced candidate is likely to be per-
ceived as disadvantaged only in a narrow, relative sense, and
would not prompt the feelings that animate contribution to or-
ganizations concerned with poverty, hunger, or disease. It is
possible that Patriot contributions might be animated by another
39. For an interesting discussion of the new kinds of relations that major philanthro-
pists have come to expect with the objects of their largesse, see John A. Byrne, The New
Face of Philanthropy, Bus. WK., Dec. 2, 2002, at 82-84.
40. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 182 (proposing governmental allocation of
Patriot dollars).
41. See id. Some analysts have suggested that people make charitable contributions to
alleviate a sense of guilt (i.e., a sense of undeserved good fortune or of responsibility for
injurious actions or events) or other negative emotional states. See DAVID A. SCHROEDER
ET AL., THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HELPING AND ALTRUISM: PROBLEMS AND PUZZLES 65-70
(1995) (discussing the "negative-state relief model" of helping or contribution); GERALD S.
SOROKER, FUND RAISING FOR PHILANTHROPY 17-18 (1974) (discussing guilt as a motivator
of charitable giving).
42. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 43; SCHROEDER ET AL., supra note 41, at
71-74 (discussing the role of "empathic arousal" in helping or contribution).
43. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 19 ("Candidates compete with one an-
other for scarce Patriot dollars, and those who can't persuade citizens to give will quickly
fall by the wayside."); SCHROEDER, ET AL., supra note 41, at 63-64.
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instigator of charitable contribution-the desire to give back to or
support one's community.44 But such an urge is differentially pre-
sent even in the voting population,45 and may or may not become
attached to the financial support of fledgling campaigns.46
For those who view Patriot contributions as being more in the
realm of political than economic activity, other conceptualizations
might emerge. Citizens with some preexisting sense of invest-
ment in the political system might conceive Patriot contributions
as a means of performing one's civic duty-much like turning out
on election day, though perhaps less inspiring because unaccom-
panied by the most salient symbols of civic participation. Com-
mitting one's publicly-provided funds to a candidate might be
viewed as doing one's part to support the discussion of issues or
elicit the full range of candidacies-an alternative to shirking or
free-riding.4" Such motivations, however, may be less than perva-
sive in a country with one of the lowest voter turnout rates of all
Western democracies.49 In any case, the Patriot scheme provides
voters little help in connecting this form of civic commitment with
financial contribution.5 °
44. See SCHROEDER ET AL., supra note 41, at 87-88 (discussing the role of social norms
such as the "norm of social responsibility" in conditioning donation of time or funds);
Charles E. Bartling, The Psychology of Asking and Giving: Taking a Crash Course in
Fund-raising, ASS'N MGMT., Nov. 1999, at 55 ("People give because they feel they have an
obligation to pay back.").
45. Psychologists have hypothesized that proclivity for contribution is affected by per-
sonality traits, such as "empathy, a sense of responsibility, concern for the welfare of oth-
ers, and a sense of self-efficacy." SCHROEDER ET AL., supra note 41, at 179. See also id. at
88-89 (discussing effect of variability in personal norms), 176-79 (discussing "prosocial
personality").
46. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 19.
47. Id. at 17. There is an interesting debate in the literature about whether rendering
political participation more private, for example through the authorization of Internet vot-
ing, would decrease participation. Some commentators predict increases in participation
by virtue of the relative ease of such expedients. See Dick Morris, Direct Democracy and
the Internet, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1033, 1051-52 (2001) (predicting "high turnout and en-
thusiasm"). Others predict that the absence of familiar symbols of participation-such as
the polling place and the opportunity to perform this responsibility side by side with one's
fellow citizens-would weaken citizens' inclination to participate. See Rick Valelly, The
Case Against Virtual Ballot Boxes: Voting Alone, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 13 & 20, 1999,
at 21. Many of the same pros and cons would apply to the prospect of ATM-based cam-
paign contribution. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 18, 67-68 (discussing the
role of the ATM in the Patriot scheme).
48. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 15-16.
49. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF
THE POLITICAL PROCESS 130 (2d ed. 2001).
50. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 17.
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For those with a more attenuated sense of investment in the
political realm, the Patriotic exercise might be the subject of a
more idle interest. Citizens who regard elections as a form of
ritualized competition might view the Patriot system as providing
them an opportunity to put money on their favorites.51 But in a
culture where the impulse to abandon oneself to the vagaries of
fortune is in constant tension with a stringent norm of responsi-
bility and self-direction,5" it is difficult to imagine the analogy to
gambling holding great sway.
The question of how Patriotic contribution is viewed by voters
is critical to determining whether the system is likely to function
in the way that the authors suggest. 3 This is a question first
about whether citizens will take part in the Patriot funding
scheme-for notwithstanding the short-term protections of their
drought-averting feedback loops, Ackerman and Ayres are quick
to admit that the Patriot funding scheme will flounder if citizens
decline to take part on a long-term basis.54 The foregoing discus-
sion does not bode particularly well for the scheme's long-term vi-
ability. The gap between the consumer-inflected manner in which
the authors present the system and the way that citizens them-
selves are likely to perceive it may be an early source of disillu-
sionment.55 Citizens will come to see that, for the range of reasons
elaborated above, Patriot expenditures do not feel like an after-
noon of shopping at the mall. This insight may be disaffecting,
leaving many to feel indifferent toward their Patriot funds.56
Moreover, citizens' understanding of the act of Patriot contribu-
tion affects not only whether they participate but how they par-
ticipate. Political enlivenment and reengagement are among the
most highly-touted byproducts of the Patriot regime.5" Citizens
who allow their Patriots to languish in their bank accounts and
citizens who spend Patriot dollars randomly or with a high level
of indifference will not follow campaigns with urgency or experi-
51. Although here, as in the analogy to the lottery above, the "payoff' for victory is
considerably more abstract, particularly if the scheme eliminates the relationship between
financial support and political influence. See id. at 6.
52. See JACKSON LEARS, SOMETHING FOR NOTHING: LUCK IN AMERICA 2-3 (2003).
53. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 120.
54. Id. at 84-87.
55. Id. at 15.
56. Id. at 17.
57. Id. at 12-13.
58. Id.
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ence a sense of involvement that precedes and follows voting on
election day.59
The success of the Patriot scheme, however, is unlikely to hinge
exclusively on the way that contribution is perceived by individ-
ual citizens. Ackerman and Ayres may be prepared to let the Pa-
triot scheme die quietly on the vine if citizen sovereigns are not
inclined to spend their publicly-allocated dollars. But once their
plan is enacted, candidates are unlikely to be so fatalistic.6" From
the time that exploratory efforts end and candidacies are de-
clared, candidates will become enmeshed in a struggle to secure a
new kind of public support-not the citizen's vote, but her Patriot
dollar.61 This will lead, as Ackerman and Ayres acknowledge, to
multiple forms of intermediation."I How such intermediaries pro-
ceed in the effort to solicit Patriot funding will also bear directly
on the prospects of the system.
IV. "CITIZEN SOVEREIGNTY" AND INTERMEDIARIES
A. Organizational Intermediation
In a world in which Patriot dollars form a new and uniquely
valuable currency, there are two kinds of tasks that will have to
be performed by or for those who hope to mount successful cam-
paigns. First, aspirants will have to reach a large and geographi-
cally dispersed group of voters." The size of the necessary pool
stems from the relatively small amount allotted to each voter un-
der the proposed Patriot scheme.64 The dispersal stems from the
fact that candidates for Congress, who are generally understood
59. These aspirations are expressed most rhapsodically by the authors in stating that
citizens will "tak[e] the time and trouble to pick out the candidates and groups that best
represent [their] hopes for America." Id. at 161. The authors further intone: "Merging
symbol with practical power, [they] will be doing [their] bit to carve out a special space for
democratic citizenship-in which ordinary people confront one another as equals as they
hammer out the basic terms of their ongoing social contract." Id.
60. See id. at 88-89.
61. Id. at 5 (stating that the Patriot plan "encourag[es] Americans to vote with their
[Patriot] dollars as well as their ballots").
62. Id. at 19-20.
63. Id. at 77-78.
64. Id. at 75-83 (hypothesizing the allocation of fifty dollars to subaccounts for the
Presidency. the Senate, and the House).
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to represent states and local districts, may receive Patriot contri-
butions from those outside their electoral jurisdictions." The sec-
ond task that aspirants, or those assisting them, will have to per-
form is persuading voters that they want to spend their Patriot
funds and (in the case of direct appeals from candidates) that
they want to spend them on a particular candidate.66 These tasks
are, to some degree, similar to those undertaken in current cam-
paigns to raise funds and solicit votes, but, under the Voting with
Dollars scheme, they are likely to be undertaken earlier and on a
broader scale than current efforts.6 ' Two kinds of instrumentali-
ties show particular promise in addressing these tasks, but they
also risk importing into the system the distinctive flaws of both
current campaign finance and current consumerism.
The first type of intermediary is the "patriotic PAC. ''6' These
organizations would be assured a central role through a striking
exception to the contributor anonymity enforced by the authors'
regime. Ackerman and Ayres provide that organizations raising
contributions from Patriot funds alone, and turning them directly
over to their candidate(s) of choice, could make such transfers
without the mask of anonymity. 69 The authors justify this excep-
tion on the grounds that a candidate's knowledge of the identity
of a patriotic PAC that supports her would not facilitate inappro-
priate influence.7" The funds thus raised and transferred would
not be those of the PAC itself, but of large numbers of individual
citizens who have chosen to expend their Patriot dollars.71 A can-
didate's responsiveness to substantial aggregations of citizens is
not inappropriate influence; it is, rather, the essence of democ-
racy.72
The authors' suggestion that no influence will follow from the
solicitation and transfer of funds by patriotic PACs is unpersua-
sive. While responsiveness to the will of aggregated majorities is,
in theory, the essence of democracy, there remains the problem of
65. Id. at 77-78.
66. Id. at 81-82.
67. Id. at 82-83.
68. Id. at 72-74.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 73-74.
71. See id.
72. See id. at 74.
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understanding that will in concrete or particularized terms.73
While devices such as polling, focus groups, or town meetings are
always possible, a candidate might most readily (and most cost
effectively) interpret the will of citizens who have supported her
through contributions to a patriotic PAC by reference to the goals
of that organization itself.74 More importantly, while it is true
that the funds transferred by a patriotic PAC would not be those
of the organization itself, it is incorrect to suggest that a candi-
date would not feel beholden to a PAC that made this kind of
transfer.75 The ability to reach for and solicit funds from a vast
and geographically dispersed pool of voters is likely to become its
own kind of currency under the Patriot dollar scheme; there is no
question that any patriotic PAC that transfers funds to a candi-
date will have paid in this particular coin." Because of such ef-
forts and because a candidate will want to be remembered by a
patriotic PAC in its future fundraising ventures, it seems likely
that a candidate will bear in mind the priorities of those who
have so assisted her when she succeeds to office.7 Thus, in the
context of this transaction, inappropriate influence is not elimi-
nated-it simply operates through a new vehicle. Organizations
or advocacy groups will simply perform the in-kind service of so-
liciting, aggregating, and transferring Patriot dollar contribu-
tions, rather than seeking influence through private donations.7
Who might benefit by this alternate route to leverage? One
group would be organizations whose ongoing activities-non-
electoral fundraising, educational campaigns, or mobilization of
citizen response to proposed legislation-bring them into contact
with large, geographically dispersed groups of Patriot dollar hold-
ers.79 Groups with existing (and extended) communications infra-
structures that could be used to solicit Patriot dollars would face
minimal start-up costs in this form of solicitation; they could use
73. See id. at 71-75; see also Morris, supra note 47, at 1044 (arguing that the Internet
has resulted in a "democratization of the flow of information").
74. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 161-64; Morris, supra note 47, at 1049-
50.
75. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 73, 163.
76. See id. at 163.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 171-74. For a related idea on the "brokering" of Patriot dollars, see Guy-
Uriel E. Charles, Mixing Metaphors: Voting, Dollars and Campaign Finance Reform, 2
ELECTION L.J. (forthcoming 2003).
79. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 163.
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existing mailing lists, and include solicitations for a patriotic PAC
in their ongoing appeals. In this respect, the Sierra Club might
have an advantage over newer groups such as Ackerman and
Ayres's hypothetical labor group, "Automobile Lovers of Amer-
ica,""° or candidate-inspired organizations such as "Environmen-
talists for Joe Smith." Though this feature would not necessarily
confer a partisan advantage,"' it would reward those with com-
munications infrastructure, direct mail lists, broad and readily
mobilized constituencies-in other words, the usual indices of
groups that already enjoy some measure of organizational
power.8 2 Also, technology might make these benefits available to a
wider array of PACs; the Internet might make it possible for
groups that are less financially or organizationally well-endowed
to connect with large, geographically dispersed groups of Patriot
dollar holders.8 3 However, as Elizabeth Garrett and others have
observed, competing successfully in the crowded field of Internet
solicitation will probably require the services of consultants and
other experts, which is likely to boost the barriers to entry for
small or less organized groups.8 4 Finally, successful patriotic PAC
fundraising requires that organizations not only reach large
numbers of voters, but effectively solicit their funds as well. 5
This requirement gives an advantage to those groups with loyal,
readily mobilized constituencies already in place-another point
in favor of preexisting organizations. 6 Again, there might be
some advantages for the outsider or less organizationally advan-
taged-for example, groups based on socially-salient ascriptive
characteristics might have high yield rates.8 7 But in general, an
80. See id. at 73, 163.
81. See id. at 173-178.
82. See id. at 73, 173-78. Some of these assets could be acquired by other kinds of or-
ganizations; yet this possibility, too, would not always point in the direction of the political
outsider. Corporate players accustomed to making large campaign contributions, but wary
of the mandatory anonymity of the secret donation booth, could invest instead in mailing
lists or other forms of communications infrastructure, and thus become involved in the
business of raising Patriot dollars.
83. See id. at 174; see also Morris, supra note 47, at 1044-46.
84. Elizabeth Garrett, Political Intermediaries and the Internet "Revolution," 34 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1055, 1056-60 (2001); see also Paul M. Schwartz, Vote.con and Internet Poli-
tics: A Comment on Dick Morris's Version of Internet Democracy, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1071, 1072-77 (2001).
85. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 78-79, 81-82, 84, 174.
86. See id.
87. Frequent examples cited by Ackerman & Ayres include the Sierra Club and the
NRA, which provide the opportunity to "maximize [one's] citizen sovereignty by contribut-
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exception permitting patriotic PACs to substitute solicitation la-
bor for direct financial contributions as a vehicle for political in-
fluence would seem to benefit those who are already organized on
a national level and engaged in various forms of political action.
As in the present system, the potential for influence will be dis-
tributed on the basis of inequalities in resources-i.e., organiza-
tional resources, which in any case are not wholly separable from
financial resources-reanimating the "circularity" problem at
which Ackerman and Ayres take aim. "8
Patriotic PACs would not be the only vehicle, however, for
reaching citizen sovereigns and their Patriot dollars. Many can-
didates, particularly those who are less well-known, will be un-
willing to leave the prospects for their support to the discretion of
well-organized advocacy groups. Similarly, many voters-
particularly those who contribute later in the campaign-will de-
cline to leave the choice of beneficiaries of their support to a pa-
triotic PAC. All of these developments underscore the importance
of a second instrumentality-advertising by the candidate's own
campaign.
B. Candidate-Sponsored Advertising
Under the current electoral regime, candidates must devote a
good deal of their energy (and large portions of their war chests)
to the task of reaching voters.8 9 This mandate will persist under
the Voting with Dollars paradigm, but the Patriot dollar feature
in particular will produce changes in the timing and focus of can-
didate efforts.9" The opportunity and, with the anticipated drop in
larger donations, the need to solicit hundreds and thousands of
ing to the [PAC] now, without waiting to get more information about the candidates and
their views."' Id. at 71.
88. Briefly stated, the problem is this: as market actors in a liberal, capitalist system,
we inevitably experience market inequalities. These inequalities are legitimated by the
fact that democratically elected legislatures can take action to address the most injurious
consequences of these inequalities. But if this form of legitimation is to be available, the
legislators whose task is to monitor and address inequalities in resources should not be
elected or influenced in ways that reflect such inequalities. See id. at 12-13; see also David
Epstein & Peter Zemsky, Money Talks: Deterring Quality Challengers in Congressional
Elections, 89 AM. POL. SC. REV. 295, 295 (1995) ("[B]y making fundraising easily observ-
able [FEC] regulations may encourage candidates to overinvest time and resources accu-
mulating large war chests instead of governing.").
89. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 162-64.
90. See id. at 162-64, 167-71.
20031
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
smaller contributions, often from voters outside a candidate's
state or district, will require that such efforts both begin earlier
in the campaign process and reach a larger number of potential
supporters. 1 Candidate communications will likewise be de-
signed, to a greater extent than is currently the case, to elicit Pa-
triot-based, as well as electoral, support.92 And, while there may
be more substantive strategies for eliciting financial backing,
such as making high-profile policy statements and debating with
other candidates in public, it seems inevitable that candidates
will draw on another time-honored means of communicating with
the electorate-political advertising.93 Ackerman and Ayres are
cryptic about both the role and content of such appeals.94 Their
book contains only occasional references to the anguished candi-
date who beseeches potential supporters to "send money now!"95
But if we reflect on the features of what is likely to be a super-
saturated market for voter attention, beginning in the early
stages of a campaign, it appears that the need to elicit Patriot dol-
lar donations may bring some of the most troublesome excesses of
contemporary advertising into the heart of political participa-
tion.9 6
First, all substantively based communications by candidates
are likely to become occasions for soliciting funds. Campaign ad-
vertising aimed at securing the vote, and even public debates, are
likely to be punctuated with references to campaign committee
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See Collins & Skover, supra note 28, at 725-27. Some evidence suggests that, un-
der the current regime, potential funders respond more to information about a candidate's
campaign organization than to information generated through the course of a campaign.
See Paul S. Herrnson, Campaign Professionalism and Fundraising in Congressional Elec-
tions, 54 J. POL. 859 (1992); Katherine Hinkley & John Green, Fundraising in Presidential
Nomination Campaigns: The Primary Lesson of 1988, 49 POL. RES. Q. 693 (1996). How-
ever, the current campaign finance regime relies to a much greater degree on elite con-
tributors who are well-informed, sophisticated analysts of campaigns than would be the
case under a regime of Patriot contribution, so the degree to which these patterns would
carry over is unclear.
94. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 258 n.15.
95. See, e.g., id. at 33, 57-58, 81, 174-75. Even this gesture toward a mode of opera-
tion fails to reflect the actual circumstances of Patriot dollar fundraising. Only the most
seasoned incumbents, and perhaps those least likely to need an emergency infusion of Pa-
triot dollars, will have a clear sense of who their supporters are and how to reach them.
See id. at 38-40, 253 n.16.
96. See id. at 164-67, 173-77; Collins & Skover, supra note 28, at 725-27, 736; Jhally
I, supra note 28, at 810-12.
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addresses or Web sites that accept on-line contributions." This
shift in itself may begin to blur the line between campaign ap-
peals and more standard commercial solicitation. The possibility
that even policy-based statements or civically-oriented appeals
may acquire the flavor of infomercials is one of the less savory
prospects raised by the authors' proposal.
More importantly, candidates are likely to mount advertise-
ments that are designed explicitly to solicit Patriot donations. As
previous research makes clear, candidates tailor their methods of
outreach, depending on the nature, size and diffusion of the popu-
lation that they hope to reach.9" Though television, radio, or on-
line advertisement99 might appear to be more costly vehicles for
solicitation, the large and diffuse character of the potential body
of funders suggests that candidates may have to spend money to
make money. '00 These advertisements are likely to be produced
under circumstances that increase the tendency toward commer-
cialized appeals, and bode ill for their contribution to substantive
deliberation during the campaign.
To begin with, such advertisements will likely be used by
lesser-known candidates, who are not incumbents. 0 1 (Though in-
97. This approach was successfully pioneered by Senator John McCain in his 2000 bid
for the presidency. See Schwartz, supra note 84, at 1076. McCain used appearances on
television and advertisements in traditional media outlets to publicize the existence of the
contribution Web site. Id. Through this approach he raised donations at a rate of up to
$20,000 an hour at the height of his New Hampshire campaign. See id.
98. See e.g., Robert Hogan, Voter Contact Techniques in State Legislative Campaigns:
The Prevalence of Mass Media Advertising, 22 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 551 (1997) (indicating that
use of mass media outreach approaches in state legislative campaigns is positively related
to total population to be reached, geographic diffusion of population to be reached, and
congruence between mass media markets and voter population to be reached). All three of
Hogan's factors would point toward the use of mass media advertising to solicit Patriot
dollars. Although Hogan's study looks at state legislative races, he observes that reliance
on mass media outreach is greater and of longer standing in federal elections. See id., at
553.
99. The characterization of on-line advertisement as a potentially costly strategy as-
sumes, as argued above, that successful Internet solicitation in a crowded field will require
the services of consultants and other experts. See Garrett, supra note 84, at 1056-60.
100. Robert Hogan observes that given the comparative breadth of the market reached
by any given mass media appeal, the resort to television or radio advertising may be less
expensive than initially assumed. Hogan, supra note 98, at 565.
101. See John G. Geer, Assessing Attack Advertising: A Silver Lining, in CAMPAIGN
REFORM: INSIGHTS AND EVIDENCE 62, 72-74 (Larry M. Bartels & Lynn Vavreck eds., 2000)
(explaining that campaign communications that are rich in substantive or "position" is-
sues are more likely to be mounted by incumbents because they have concrete policies to
discuss).
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cumbents may occasionally resort to such methods, they are
likely to have a clearer sense of the populations that form their
most likely supporters and how to reach them.) They are also
likely to be mounted at a comparatively early stage of the cam-
paign,"2 when the identities of opponents, and the most salient
substantive issues have not yet crystallized. Each of these factors
reduces the likelihood that a campaign advertisement will em-
phasize informational or policy-related content. Moreover, the
range of candidates seeking to solicit the large and dispersed au-
dience of Patriot holders is likely to result in a glut of appeals to
voters. Citizens will encounter such appeals not only in their
mailboxes and in traditional media outlets, but through Internet
advertising, which is already becoming saturated with commer-
cial appeals. In the face of such a glut, and in the absence of crys-
tallized substantive issues, production values may become in-
creasingly important. It may be necessary, as consultant Dick
Morris has argued with respect to Internet advertising, to use
"humor, incentives, and attractive messages ... to lure the voter
to pay attention."'0 3 Incited to entertain and lure the voter, as
well as to differentiate their candidate in a crowded market for
funds, there is good reason to believe that campaigns will move,
like their commercial advertising counterparts, from an emphasis
on "product information" to an emphasis on "product image" in
presenting their candidates.0 4
Patriot holders will be invited to support candidates for reasons
that depend even less on the policy programs of candidates than
current primary or general election votes do, and more on the
candidates' personal qualities. While some of these qualities such
102. See Robert Biersack et al., Seeds for Success: Early Money in Congressional Cam-
paigns, 18 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 535 (1993) (concluding that early money increases success of
later fundraising from all sources for inexperienced candidates, and from PAC sources for
established candidates).
Research suggests that even under the current paradigm, this generalized motivation
involves different subsidiary judgments and different patterns of contribution. Some con-
tributors are deeply loyal to their candidates, and will be particularly inclined to contrib-
ute when their candidate appears to be losing ground in the polls or primaries. Others
wish to contribute but, lacking a strong affinity for a particular candidate, will contribute
only when a candidate's primary performance suggests that their money will be effectively
spent. See Diana C. Mutz, Effects of Horse-Race Coverage on Campaign Coffers: Strategic
Contributing in Presidential Primaries, 57 J. POL. 1015 (1995).
103. Morris, supra note 47, at 1043.
104. See Collins & Skover, supra note 28, at 707-10 (discussing the twentieth century
move from product information to product image in commercial advertising).
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as energy and integrity may speak to a candidate's merits as a fu-
ture representative, others such as personal attractiveness or
telegenicity may not. This movement toward the commercialized
or commodified presentation of the candidate may be exacerbated
as candidates learn more about what motivates citizens to con-
tribute Patriot dollars. Ackerman and Ayres assume that the mo-
tivation will be similar to that involved in electoral choices-
citizens will support with Patriot dollars those candidates that
they believe will make the best elected officials.1" 5 However, this
assumption may not prove to be well-grounded. Just as voters
sometimes support primary candidates that they would feel am-
bivalent about supporting in the general election," 6 voters may
support campaigns to meet political needs quite separate from
the election of the best representative. They may funnel Patriot
dollars in order to cast a protest vote, or to satisfy a nostalgia for
a kind of politics or community that they are unlikely to find in
functioning, contemporary government.0 7
Moreover, given the difficulty of associating Patriot contribu-
tion with the most obvious market or participatory analogies, it is
also possible that at least some voters will make Patriot dona-
tions on the basis of motives unrelated to serious political judg-
ments. Donations may become the subjects of office betting pools
or operate as a form of collective entertainment, similar to fan-
tasy sports leagues. Campaigns might choose to exploit this at-
tenuated connection to political judgment by marketing candi-
dates much as they market other commercial commodities, such
as satisfying needs and longings for youth, sexual appeal, status,
and a sense of security or belonging.' 8 Campaigns might focus
not only on product image advertisement, but also on its more re-
105. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 16-17 (comparing citizens' votes with
Patriot dollars); see also supra Part III.
106. Examples of this include: third-party candidates, protest candidates, and candi-
dates of color when a majority of voters are white. See Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting Rights
Law Now at War with Itself?: Social Science and Voting Rights in the 2000's, 80 N.C. L.
REV. 1517, 1525 n.16 (2002) (discussing variances in votes for candidates of color).
107. Ackerman and Ayres might answer that one of the goals of the Voting with Dol-
lars system is to make more plausible the kind of candidacies that would vitiate the need
for protest votes. Campaign finance, however, is only one of the features of the existing
political system that inspires unfairness, or a desire on the part of voters to protest. It
therefore seems to be a plausible expectation that some desire to express protest on the
part of voters would persist.
108. See, e.g., Jhally II, supra note 28 (explaining that advertisements offer images of
human happiness).
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cent commercial successor, "lifestyle" advertisement, which asso-
ciates a particular product with an attractive environment, feel-
ing, or activity, and implies that purchase of the product will con-
nect the consumer to that value. °9 The final irony of Ackerman
and Ayres's proposal is that the consumerist analogy embedded
at its heart may be rejected by voters independently considering
the logic of the Patriot account, but reinstigated by campaign ad-
vertising, in ways that defeat their broader aspirations for politi-
cal transformation. Instead of feeling reconnected to a world of
expanded political possibilities, citizen sovereigns might feel en-
ervated by a glut of non-substantive entreaties or narcotized by a
slick, commercialized appeal to a range of apolitical needs. 110
V. CONCLUSION
Imagining the chain of events that would be triggered by a
proposal that itself has many features of a thought experiment is
an inherently speculative enterprise. While the dystopian conse-
quences I explore above are possible, none is an inevitable conse-
quence of the Voting with Dollars paradigm. In closing, I want to
suggest some ways in which Ackerman and Ayres's proposal
might be modified, or simply elaborated, to address some of the
problems I have surveyed.
It seems worth noting that, in some respects, Ackerman and
Ayres's proposal isn't a thought experiment at all. In addressing
the most palpable threats of circumvention or cooptation, the
proposal has the precision of a piece of enacted legislation. The
proposal is replete with five-day cancellation periods for Patriot
transactions,"' backup plans for governmental pro-activity in ad-
justing the balance between public and private," 2 and complex
algorithms for keeping large donations from upsetting the ano-
nymity of the secret donation booth." 3
109. Collins & Skover, supra note 28, at 710.
110. As Jules Henry explained in Culture Against Man: "[I]n order for our economy to
continue in its present form people must learn to be fuzzy-minded and impulsive, for if
they were clear-headed and deliberate they would rarely put their hands in their pockets;
or if they did, they would leave them there." Collins & Skover, supra note 28, at 712 (quot-
ing JULES HENRY, CULTURE AGAINST MAN 48 (1963)).
111. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 101.
112. Id. at 89-90.
113. Id. at 91.
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But while it is highly developed in its object of preventing cir-
cumvention, the authors' plan, as I have argued, is radically un-
derdeveloped in what should be one of its most prominent fea-
tures-a set of understandings that help to socialize
inexperienced and potentially alienated citizen sovereigns to this
new form of participation.
Voters will need to be educated to value the act of contributing
small sums of publicly allocated funding to political campaigns.
In order to persuade citizens that a contribution of ten or fifteen
dollars may express a political vision, or confer a sense of mem-
bership, it may be necessary to implement the plan in ways that
emphasize its origins in the franchise, as well as in consumer
sovereignty. It may be necessary to designate a series of "dona-
tion days," in order to focus attention, and even public debate
around the prospect of Patriot donation."1 It may be useful to
program ATM machines to print out stickers announcing that the
wearer has made a Patriot contribution, in order to stimulate
public awareness of the program and introduce a level of peer
pressure. What additional measures may be necessary to create a
feeling of connection or collectivity through the individualized act
of contribution-such as the use, on "donation days," of special-
ized ATM terminals at schools or courthouses-will depend on
how quickly broad segments of the population become socialized
to the new practice.
It is also possible that in the hybrid spirit of the proposal,
commercial or mass media vehicles, may also be used to expose
citizens to the activity of Patriot contribution. The government, or
perhaps other organizations interested in the mobilization of par-
ticular segments of the electorate, might explicitly deploy con-
sumerist strategies in order to "sell" Patriot contribution to the
public, in much the way that MTV's "Rock the Vote" campaign
presented Madonna, attired solely in an American flag, to per-
suade young voters that participation was sexy. Or in a less ex-
plicitly commercialized vein, those responsible for implementing
the proposal might deploy variants of the compelling public ser-
vice advertisements that circulated after September 11, 2001, in
114. I thank Dan Farber for a series of suggestions, from the serious to the whimsical,
that included designating "donation day" and more public settings for contribution. It also
spurred me to consider further the deployment of commercial strategies in the interest of
political socialization.
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order to highlight the experience, and implicitly extol the benefits
of Patriot contribution. Perhaps the best of those advertisements,
which presented a series of citizens from various racial, ethnic
and socioeconomic groups, declaring "I am an American,"115 could
be used as a prototype, to present a similarly broad sampling of
participants commenting briefly on the meaning of contributing
Patriot dollars to campaigns.
As committed liberals, Ackerman and Ayres may be under-
standably reluctant to venture onto such potentially prescriptive
territory. They prefer, instead, to use a kind of Madisonian
logic-allow the foibles of the available human participants (in
this case, the tendency toward commercialized consumption) to
supply the energies necessary to drive participation. But while
this approach may succeed for the constitutional separation of
powers-where, in the properly structured environment, ambition
will arise almost spontaneously to counteract ambition-it is
likely to be less successful with respect to the confluence to con-
sumerism and contribution. The perceived parallels are tenuous,
and they are more likely to be exploited by campaign advertisers
than deeply experienced by individual participants. The Voting
with Dollars regime can succeed only as part of a larger project of
political elaboration and socialization. It is possible, I suspect, to
address that task in a manner that is sufficiently pluralistic to
satisfy the liberal premises of its authors. But it must be ad-
dressed, if the project is to yield political engagement, rather than
anomic confusion, or commercialized torpor.
115. The Ad Council, I Am an American, at http://www.adcouncil.org/campaigns/-am
anAmerican/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2003).
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